Despite substantial evidence that foreign direct investment (FDI) is influenced by taxation, the impact of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is surprisingly unclear. We investigate one possible reason: previous empirical research restricts treaties to have a one-time, discrete effect on FDI. We find this assumption to be rejected in the data on US inbound FDI. Moreover, allowing for anticipatory and lagged effects of treaty formation indicates a more substantial, positive effect on FDI activity.
Introduction
Foreign affiliate sales (FAS) grew by 11% in the 1990s, roughly double the growth rate for exports and quadruple the growth rate for worldwide GDP (Markusen 2002) . In 2004, total FAS represented nearly 51% of world GDP, with world exports representing roughly half this amount (Ramondo 2007) . In light of important and expanding role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in today's global economy, a vast literature has emerged attempting to uncover the salient factors determining the spatial and temporal pattern of FDI activity. In this paper, we investigate one potential factor: bilateral tax treaties.
Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical impact of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is very murky. This ambiguity exists amid fairly pervasive empirical evidence that cross-country variation in taxation does influence the distribution of FDI activity (e.g. today's bilateral FDI activity. Specially, the number of tax treaties in force has increased from 100 in the 1960s to over 2,500 more recently (Egger et al. 2006 ). The US presently belongs to roughly 60 such treaties, covering approximately 78% of total US outbound FDI and 96% of total US inbound FDI, with over one-third being implemented since 1990 (Blonigen and Davies 2004 ).
While the theoretical literature on bilateral tax treaties is more developed, empirical studies are relatively sparse. Blonigen and Davies (2004, 2005) and strong positive effects of .old tax treaties on FDI, but negative effects of .new tax treaties, using 1980.1999 US and 1983.1992 OECD data, respectively, particularly when modeling FDI in levels (as opposed to logs). Davies (2003a) finds no effect of revisions of existing bilateral tax treaties on FDI, and Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1993) find that the expansion of activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is essentially independent of withholding taxes. Davies (2004) provides an excellent review. 2 The mixed, and perhaps counter-intuitive, empirical results could be an artifact of the restriction implicit in the empirical approach that overshadows nearly all of these previous studies: treaties are allowed to have only a one-time, discrete effect on FDI. Given the complexity of the treaties, the political environment in which they are negotiated, and the fixed costs associated with FDI activity, it is possible that firms are aware of at least the possibility of a treaty prior to its actual formation, leading to effects of the treaty that pre-date official implementation (referred to as anticipatory effects). On the other hand, it is possible that firms may react slowly to a newly formed treaty, leading to effects of a treaty several periods after official implementation (referred to as lagged effects).
To assess the timing issue empirically, we utilize data on US inbound and outbound FDI stocks, flows, and FAS over the period 1980--1999 . The data are from Blonigen and Davies (2004) , and thus enable us to compare our findings to the existing literature. Our results are striking, indicating the importance of allowing for a more complex timing of responses to tax treaties in empirical research, particularly when analyzing US inbound FDI. However, allowing for this flexibility does not resolve some of the empirical puzzles present in the data. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology.
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Methodology

A Model with Flexible Timing
To contrast the assumptions required for various estimators to identify the causal impact of bilateral tax treaties, we utilize the potential outcomes framework often adopted in the program evaluation literature. However, in a more general model that allows for both anticipatory and lagged effects of the treatment being analyzed -in this case, the presence of bilateral tax treatythe framework is a bit more complex. To begin, let 
denote a measure of FDI activity involving countries i and j at time t, which in principal may depend on the tax treaty status of the two countries in all periods. Equation (1) In contrast to the existing literature, the setup in (1) allows FDI activity to depend on more than just whether a bilateral tax treaty is currently in place. For example, suppose we are considering three periods (T = 3). Thus, there are eight (2³ = 8) potential outcomes in time period Given this flexibility in the timing of the treaty effect, defining the treatment effect of a tax treaty between contracting countries i and j on FDI activity at time t requires defining a 'treated' state, say 1 D and a 'control' state, say 0 D . This entails specifying a complete pattern of tax treaty status. The observation-specific treatment effect is then given by Although relatively straightforward, the fundamental problem of causal inference is that, at most, only one state of world (and, hence, potential outcome) is observed for a given pair of countries at a particular point in time (Holland 1986 . Thus, the effect of the treatment 1 D relative to the control 0 D cannot be computed; instead, it must be estimated. This entails estimation of the missing counterfactual under some set of identifying assumptions. More generally, one observes
where Ω denotes the set of all possible combinations of D and I [⋅] is an indicator function.
To circumvent the missing counterfactual problem, we specify a structural relationship for the potential outcome associated with each possible pattern of tax treaty status. Define 
where D = 0 represents a pair of countries with no bilateral tax treaty in any period,  s  captures the lagged effects of tax treaties (i.e., the effect of a tax treaty being in place s periods in the past),  s  captures the anticipatory effects of tax treaties (i.e., the effect of a tax treaty being in place s periods in the future), and 0  is the contemporaneous effect of a tax treaty. We obtain (3) by assuming that effect of a tax treaty in some period s on FDI activity in some period t (s,t = OLS estimation of (3) yields a consistent estimate of the  parameters if, conditional on x, the presence or absence of a tax treaty in any time period is independent of contemporaneous (i) unobservables affecting FDI activity without a tax treaty in each time period, and (ii) unobserved, country-pair-specific gains in each time period from deviating from no tax treaty in all time periods (D = 0) to the observed pattern (D = d).
In contrast, a consistent estimate of the  parameters may be obtained under an alternative set of assumptions. Given the presence of panel data, where at least some country-pairs are observed both with and without an effective tax treaty during the sample period, then (3) may be estimated using either fixed effects (FE) or first-differences (FD). Either method allows one to decompose unobservable determinants of FDI activity as
where ij  represents time invariant, country-pair-specific unobsevables affecting FDI activity
represents idiosyncratic shocks to FDI between countries i and j (given D = d).
As is well known (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2001, Chapter 10), FE estimation of (5) To make the model in (5) a bit more tractable and the coefficient estimates a bit easier to interpret, the estimating equation actually employed in the analysis is given by  captures the instantaneous response, and
capture any lagged effects. The omitted category contains periods two or more years prior to a tax treaty becoming effective.
A Model with Restricted Timing
While existing empirical studies of bilateral tax treaties have utilized FE estimation to remove time invariant, country-pair-specific unobservables, they do not permit the sort of flexible timing of response to a bilateral tax treaty as in (5) Instead, tax treaties are restricted to have only a one-time, discrete change in FDI activity, as in
Thus, (7) reduces to (5) only in the event of no anticipatory or lagged effects of tax treaties. Given the discussion earlier about the several possible dates that one could use to define the tax treaty variable (discussed in Section 3), combined with the fact that some of the effects of a tax treaty may precede the treaty (anticipatory effects) or operate with a lag (lagged effects), the restricted model in (7) seems likely to be mis-specified in the current context.
A formal specification test for the restricted model in (7) (9) by OLS and testing 0 :
via a standard t-test using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and (serial) correlation.
Data
The data come from Blonigen and Davies (2004) ; thus, we provide only limited details4. (2003). The specification is based on the knowledge-capital model of MNE activity. In the models analyzing both US inbound and outbound FDI activity, the vector of covariates includes the sum of real gross domestic products (GDPs), the GDP difference between the US and foreign country squared, the (absolute value of the) skill difference between the US and foreign country, the distance between US and foreign country, a trade cost measure for home and host country, an investment barrier measure for the host country, the interaction between the skill difference and GDP difference, and the interaction between the host trade cost and the squared skill difference.
We also include a dummy variable for old treaty countries. Finally, to improve the likelihood that the tax treaty variables are strictly exogenous, in some specifications we augment the covariate set to include interactions between a dummy variable for 'rich' countries and each of the aforementioned variables.5 Table 1 displays summary statistics.
Results
Inbound FDI
To begin, Moreover, even among the models that remove time invariant, country-level heterogeneity, the results are sensitive to modeling choice as the FE estimator yields a positive and statistically significant of an effective tax treaty on FDI stocks and flows, whereas FD does not (in fact, two of the three point estimates are negative).
The differences between the FD and FE estimates suggest the possibility of mis-specification.
To formally test the equivalence of the FD and FE estimates, we utilize the specification test proposed in Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) . The results are shown in the row labeled Specification Test. We reject equality of the FD and FE estimates at the p < 0.10 level for all three FDI measures when excluding rich country interactions, and two of the three measures (Panels I and II) when including the interactions. Thus, the assumption of no anticipatory and lagged effects of tax treaties is not supported by the data.
To relax this assumption, then, we estimate the model given in (6) via FD and FE. The estimates of the  parameters for the level specifications are given in Panel I of Table 3 ; the full set of results is provided in the Appendix, Tables A5-A6 . Concentrating on the models including rich country interactions, three findings emerge. First, the FD and FE estimates are much more closely aligned; in only one situation (the coefficient on New Treaty two years prior for FDI flows) are the coefficients of the opposite sign, but then each is statistically insignificant.
Second, for both FDI stocks and flows, we find positive and statistically significant lagged effects of tax treaties, particularly in the FE models. In other words, the FDI-inducing impact of an effective tax treaty is not realized until a couple of years after the treaty becomes effective.
This may suggest that the most important FDI-inducing component of bilateral tax treaties is the reduction in uncertainty in the foreign tax environment, as such diminished uncertainty may be realized after a lag. It is also consonant with the gradualism argument in Chisik and Davies (2004b) , where declines in tax rates may be gradual since tax treaties need to be self-enforcing.
However, these effects are very modest in economic terms, representing roughly 0.03 -0.04 standard deviations. Finally, consonant with the results in Table 2 , we find no impact of an effective tax treaty on FAS once rich country interactions are included. Thus, we find some evidence of positive effects of a new tax treaty on the level of US inbound FDI stocks and flows, but not FAS, although the effects tend to be small and operate with a lag.
As noted previously, Blonigen and Davies (2004) , Mutti and Grubert (2004) , and others advocate the estimation of models of FDI activity in logs given the skewed nature of the data.
Panels IV-VI in Table 2 present the estimates for the restricted timing model when we log all (non-binary) variables.6 In the interest of brevity, we focus on the major findings. First, for FDI stocks and flows, we fail to find any statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty in the RE, FD, and FE models, either with or without rich country interactions. Moreover, in all four cases, we fail to reject equality between the FD and FE estimates at conventional levels of statistical significance. Second, we find positive, statistically significant, and (unreasonably) large effects on FAS using the RE and FE estimators either with or without rich country interactions; negative, statistically significant, and (unreasonably) large effects using POLS.
Finally, we reject equality of the FD and FE estimates using the Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) specification test for FAS either with or without rich country interactions.
Turning to the more flexible model for FAS in Table 3 , we again find much greater alignment between the FD and FE estimates.7 In particular, in the models including rich country interactions, we find positive and statistically significant lagged effects of new tax treaties according to both the FD and FE estimates, with the magnitudes remaining quite large.
Moreover, the FE estimates also indicate fairly sizeable, statistically significant anticipatory effects of tax treaties. Perhaps surprising, not one of the coefficients reflecting the contemporaneous effect of tax treaties is statistically significant in either Panel I or II of Table 3 once rich country interactions are included.
In sum, then, the regression analysis yields a positive, statistically significant, and relatively robust effect of an effective bilateral tax treaty when one allows for a more flexible timing of the impact on US inbound FDI stocks and flows (in levels) and FAS (in logs) and includes rich country interactions. We now turn to the regression results for US outbound FDI. Table 4 presents estimates of τ₀ from the restricted model given in (7) . Results from the flexible timing models are presented in Table 5 . The full set of regression estimates is available in the Appendix, Tables A9-A16. In the interest of brevity, we focus on the major findings. First, when estimating the models in levels, we only obtain one statistically significant effect of a new tax treaty when using an estimation method other than POLS: FDI stocks (Panel I) when using RE without rich country interactions. For the remainder of the non-POLS models in levels, the estimated impact of an effective tax treaty is statistically insignificant. Moreover, we fail to reject equality between the FD and FE estimates at conventional levels in all cases. The point estimates in the FE models with rich country interactions are positive, however, for all three FDI measures.
Outbound FDI
Second, when estimating the models in logs, we obtain a positive and statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty on FAS using POLS and FD both with and without rich country In sum, then, the regression analysis for US outbound FDI yields a much more muted impact of effective tax treaties relative to US inbound FDI. Specifically, there is no statistically meaningful evidence of a non-zero effect of an effective tax treaty -even in the more flexible specifications -when analyzing FDI in levels. There is, however, some evidence of a positive and statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty on FDI stocks and FAS in the log models, the former (latter) occurring with a lag (instantaneously), and a negative lagged effect on log FDI flows.
Conclusion
Economists have been a bit puzzled by bilateral tax treaties because of the divergence of the empirical and theoretical results in the literature, the fragility of existing empirical estimates, as well as the extreme magnitudes obtained in some specifications. Whereas the theoretical literature suggests that such treaties can be FDI-inducing, the empirical (and legal) literature disputes these claims in practice. In this paper, we have re-examined the panel data set from Second, the regression estimates indicate some asymmetric impacts of effective tax treaties on US inbound and outbound FDI. As just stated, in our preferable specifications for US inbound FDI, we obtain positive effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI stocks and flows (in levels) and FAS (in logs) several years after the tax treaty becomes effective. For US outbound FDI, we obtain some less robust evidence of positive effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI stocks and FAS (in logs), the former occurring with a lag. However, we also obtain some evidence of negative effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI flows (in logs) several years after the tax treaty becomes effective. Thus, in the end, while relaxing the assumption of no anticipatory or lagged effects of a bilateral tax treaty resolves some of the puzzle with respect the empirical effects of such treaties, some issues remain unresolved. Most notably, the decision to model FDI activity in levels or logs remains crucial, as does the decision to focus on inbound or outbound FDI. Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
6. Note, Blonigen and Davies (2004) exclude the two interaction terms --between the skill difference and GDP difference and between the host trade cost and the squared skill difference --in their log specifications since the log of the interaction is collinear with the other variables entered in the model. However, rather than taking the log of the interactions, we include the interactions of the logs so that these variables remain in the model. The impact on the results is minor.
7.
The full set of results is provided in the Appendix, Tables A7-A8. 
